
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as the Cuban Government is Communist-dominated which will:

- Ensure offensive weapons are not reintroduced:
- Reduce the ability of the Soviet Union or Communist China to use Cuba as a base for military, paramilitary or subversive activities against the Mestern Memisphere:
- 3. Reduce the ability of Cuba to engage in military, paramilitary or subversive activities against Mestern Hemisphere countries:
- 4. To whatever extent may be feasible, contribute to the development in Cuba of a government which pursues a course independent of Soviet or Chinese Communist interests, optimally one that is non-Communist and has representative government.

Hethods:

- First Assumption -- Cuba does not cooperate and Soviets seek maintain maximum military and political presence.
 - 1. Seek indefinitely extend arrangements for ICAC inspection of incoming stipe.

Comment: In absence Cuban and Soviet agreement ICRC would refuse to carry out.

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2. Reestablish enforcement of quarantine.

Convent: Threat to do so could constitute pressure on Cuba and Soviets to a ree to continued IGMC i spection or other acceptable arrangements. Actual reestablishment of enforcement after offensive usupons are removed would prosent varying degrees of political difficulty and would recuire consideration in the light of the circumstances at the time.

3. Maintain U. S. aerial surveillance.

Comment: Present CAS resolution provides sufficient sanction and there would be few non-bloc political problems. The military problem of doing so in the face of opposition would depend on the degree of continued Soviet participation in Cuban air defense, and especially whether surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) are maintained. In case of active military opposition, continuing effective aerial surveillance would require the United States to take defensive actions against the interfering air defenses to protect our aircraft. The best means of deterring such opposition and, if it occurs, giving basis for further action on our part would be prior public statement of cur intent. Extent of actual overflight required could be determined by success in developing other intelligence sources. Continued success: low level overflights could have some adverse internal political effects on Castro regime.





4. Haintain, and to the degree feasible, strengthen present intelligence gathering operations (including aerial reconnaissance) against shipping destined for Cube.

Comment: This should be an adjunct, and supplementary to any line of action than does not result in an adequate inspection system in Cuban ports.

B. Second Assumption: Cuba does not cooperate, but Soviets renounce or do not appear to be maintaining a military presence in Cuba.


Comment: On assumption Knrus.chev uill seek to justify uithdrawal of offensive weapons as "saving Com umism in Cuba", degree of further Sovie military withdrawal from Cuba may be related to degree of "quarantees" for Cuba he is able to obtain from U. S. Thus, freedom of action we may have under this assumption may be related to degree of "quarantees" we may have given under these circumstances.

Rees ablish enforcement of quarantine.

Comment: It is very unlikely Soviets will, in any initial stage, entirely withdraw militarily without first having obtained from us some agreement that will limit our freedom of action with respect at least to the quarantine.

2. Maintain serial surveillance.

Comment: With the withdrawal of the Soviet military presence (and thus presumably the SAIs) there should be no great military difficu in maintaining effective air survoillance. Political difficulties





would also be minimal. Cuban attempts at interference could be met by calculated measures of defense that would attrite Cuban air capabilities.

C. Third Assumption: Cuba cooperates or acquiesces in control measures.

Comment: The likelihood of such cooperation will in large part be
dependent on Castro's estimate as to whether such control measures will
also operate so as to protect his regime. The problem, therefore, is
to devise measures which, while effective from the standpoint of our
interest in ensuring against the reintroduction of offensive weapons
also will appear to Castro as constituting some protection for him.
There are two general types of measures, each of which can be designed
somewhat to serve both these purposes but each of which have their
difficulties.


The <u>first</u> type is UN measures of various kinds. The difficulty with these is devising scrething that does not recognize and give the Soviets a continuing role in Bestern Hemisphere affairs.

The second type is OAS measures of various kinds. The difficulty with these is that they tend to require in some degree readmitting Castro into the OAS structure and thus run directly counter to our long and successful afforts in exactly the opposite direction.

III. Proposed Course of Action:

There are several theoretically possible solutions:





A continuing UN presence in Cuba placed there by the Security Council.

This arrangement would confirm and extend Soviet involvement in the

Caribbean, and make the UB's inspection system in Cuba subject to Russian

veto. It is, therefore, not acceptable.

An <u>CAS inspection arrangement</u> would not work as long as the Cuban regime remains "incompatible" with the inter-American system - i.e., until there is enough political change in Cuba to reverse last year's Funta dal Este decision

A <u>Latin American denuclearised</u> some risks being a mere self-denying ordinance without teeth in the form of international inspection arrangements.

The inherent difficulty with any of these arrangements is that to the degree that they are acceptable to Cuba, they will guarantee Castro against outside interference with his regime's control and, to that degree, will correspondingly be unacceptable to United States and Latin American opinion.

The most promising line of approach, therefore, is an arrangement that combines to the degree possible the virtues of all three of these proposals and minimizes their vices. Such a proposal would be a Latin American demuclearised sone, using the UN presence as its executive agent for inspection.

- Such a proposal is spelled out in TAB A. Briefly, it would involve these elements.
- The General Assembly passes a modified Brasilian resolution, praising
 the general idea of regional demulsarized somes for Latin America and
 Africa.





- 2. The Brazilians, or perhaps a group of Latin American countries, call an ad hoc conference of all Latin American countries, including Cuba, to establish a Latin American denuclearised some. The United States (as a nation of the region) and the United Kingdom, France and the Netherlands (in view of their dependent territories in the region) would also be invited to the meeting.
- This meeting adopts a self-denying ordinance on the acquisition of nuclear weapons and delivery systems.
- 4. The European powers concerned undertake not to station muclear weapons or delivery vehicles, or permit their introduction, into their dependent territories in the some.


5. The ad hoc meeting would request the Secretary General to establish an

Inspectorate to serve the zone by inspection to the degree necessary to assure that all signatories of the self-denying ordinance were abiding by their commitment. (This arrangement is consistent with the Brazilian resolution as it now stands.) The Inspectorate, which would be or anize and appointed by the Secretary General of the United Mations, would have free necess to all of the countries of the zone and would visit them sitter on its own initiative or to investigate complaints of violation of the basic agreement.

The <u>ad hoc</u> conference would establish a continuing Committee to supervise adherence to the agreement, to hear complaints (and also to screen out frivolous complaints), and to receive reports from the

Insp ctorate






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Inspectorate on its work.

6. In the background would be the determination of the United States, and of the whole OAS group, to move in and to put sufficient pressure on any country which did not abide by its promise to cooperate in the denuclearization of Latin America.



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